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Abstract
The current study attempted to answer the following research question: what were the
causes of the French and Indian War between Great Britain and France in 1754? To do so, the
current study researched secondary sources from a historical perspective, political theories
regarding the causes of war, and primary sources from individuals involved in the build-up to
conflict. Previous research by historians and political scientists have mainly attributed the causes
of the French and Indian War to a security dilemma and the spiral theory of war. The current
study does not support this assertion. Instead, the current study asserts that because of
asymmetric information, the presence of an indivisible issue, and brinkmanship, bargaining
failed and conflict began between Great Britain and France. Britain and France both took
offensive measures to strengthen their positions in North America and counter their adversaries'
movements prior to the start of the French and Indian War. At the same time, the presence of
asymmetric information regarding the enemy’s resolve and strength due to poor intelligence, an
indivisible issue in the Ohio region, and the hard-line stances from politicians on both sides
hindered effective negotiations to stop the escalating conflict. As a result, given these
pre-existing conditions, negotiations between Britain and France were bound to fail and war
between Britain and France was destined to break out in North America.

Key Words: French and Indian War, Colonial History, Political Theory, the Bargaining Theory
of War, History, and Political Science
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A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR
Introduction
The French and Indian War has long been overlooked by both historians and political
scientists. Compared to more famous wars such as World War I or World War II, there is limited
scholarship on the French and Indian War, especially in regards to the causes of the war.1 As a
result, the French and Indian War, fought between 1754 and 1763 between the empires of France
and Great Britain, remains a relative mystery, despite its importance to the future of North
America. However, despite the limited literature on the causes of the French and Indian War, the
general consensus asserts the war is best explained by the spiral model of war and peace.2 In this
framework, the security dilemma leads opposing states to build up their respective security until
conflict is unavoidable. Historian and political scientist Richard Smoke first put the French and
Indian War in this category when he described the war as a conflict spiral with “no offensive
steps made by any player at any time”.3 Political scientists Jack Levy and William Thompson
later echoed Smoke’s assertion in their book Causes of War: “Another good example of a
conflict spiral is the process leading up to the Seven Years’ War between Britain and France in
North America”.4 Thus, previous literature has primarily attributed the causes of the French and
Indian War to the security dilemma and the spiral model of war and peace.
Through an analysis of the history prior to the French and Indian War, the current study
will assert that there was no security dilemma prior to conflict, as both Britain and France
adopted an offensive mentality and made offensive actions. Since there was no security dilemma
prior to conflict between the British and the French, the spiral model of war and peace cannot be
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attributed as a cause of war. Given this departure from previous literature, the current study’s
findings are crucially important for understanding the history of the French and Indian War, and
for potential future analyses of other colonial conflicts. Instead, the current study asserts that
because of asymmetric information, the presence of an indivisible issue, and brinkmanship,
bargaining failed and conflict began between Great Britain and France. Britain and France both
took offensive measures to strengthen their positions in North America and counter their
adversaries' movements prior to the start of the French and Indian War. At the same time, the
presence of asymmetric information regarding the enemy’s resolve and strength due to poor
intelligence, an indivisible issue in the Ohio region, and the hard-line stances from politicians on
both sides hindered effective negotiations to stop the escalating conflict. As a result, given these
pre-existing conditions, negotiations between Britain and France were bound to fail and war
between Britain and France was destined to break out in North America.
Sources and Methodology
The current study features three main types of sources to conduct its historical analysis of
the causes of the French and Indian War. First, I used secondary sources, mainly from a
historical perspective, to provide the necessary context and background information. Second, I
focused on primary sources from the time period to provide insight into the individuals who were
directly involved in the build-up to conflict. Finally, I selected scholarly articles that focus on
political theory in order to craft an argument on why war occurred between the British and the
French. Given these sources, the current study is committed to providing a combination of
historical and political science scholarship in order to conduct a complete analysis of the causes
of war from both perspectives. An interdisciplinary study of the French and Indian War is
necessary to provide a complete analysis of the causes of the war, as all perspectives must be
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considered in this process. I also acknowledge that I am writing an imperial history and choosing
not to focus on the Indigenous peoples whose land the British and French would eventually fight
over. Although Indigenous peoples are featured as a part of the historical background
information, the central analysis of the current study is written from a European perspective with
Indigenous people at the periphery. Finally, the current study has chosen the French and Indian
War as its terminology for the conflict because of the focus on North America.5 All of the
historical background information and analysis is focused on the events and actors in North
America, which makes the French and Indian War the most accurate description for the current
study.
Historical Background Information: Timeline
In 1752, settlers from Virginia established the first permanent British trading post in the
Ohio country.6 This marked the first significant measuring point in the build-up to the war, as it
marked the first direct territorial dispute between the British and the French in the contentious
Ohio country. In response to the British advances, the governor of New France, Marquis
Duquesne, ordered French troops into the region to remove the trading post and construct a series
of forts on the region’s key rivers: the Ohio River and LeBoeuf Creek which led to Lake Erie. To
the British, this was a clear escalation, as the construction of four forts was a much larger
investment than a trading post. To confirm the French intentions, the British sent a small force of
colonial militia led by George Washington to scout the forts under a diplomatic mission. In
December of 1753, George Washington described in his journal the significant investment of the
French in the Ohio country, writing, “according to the best judgement I could form, there are an
hundred exclusive of officers, of which there are many. I also gave orders to the people that were
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with me, to take an exact account of the canoes that were hauled up to convey their forces down
in the spring, which they did, and told 50 of birch bark and 170 of pine.”7 Clearly, the French had
decided to make a significant investment in the Ohio country through the construction of forts
and deployment of troops into the region.
After George Washington and other British scouts confirmed the construction of the
French forts and deployment of French troops, Britain countered the French advance by sending
more colonial militia into the region. These troops, led once again by George Washington, were
instructed to remove the French from the region and construct a British fort at the forks of the
Ohio river.8 While on his way to establish the fort, Washington and his troops ran into a small
group of French forces at Jumonville’s Glen, and quickly defeated them on May 28th, 1754,
marking the first unofficial conflict of the war. This small conflict had major diplomatic
repercussions, as within the conflict French ambassador Joseph Coulon de Jumonville was killed.
In the eyes of Washington and the British, the French had not publicly revealed themselves to be
on a diplomatic mission, as their secrecy and strength made them appear like a war party. In his
personal journal, Washington said “that was an escort worthy of a prince serving an ambassador,
instead of which it was only a mere French petty officer; spies are not needed by an ambassador,
whose dignity is always sacred. If they came with good intentions, why stay for two days five
miles away from us without imparting the summons to me, or revealing anything relating to his
embassy.”9 To the British, the French had initiated the attack, and had not revealed the
diplomatic nature of their force at any point prior to the conflict. The French claimed that they
had announced their diplomatic mission, which Washington and the British said was an absolute
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falsehood.10 Thus, the French perceived Washington’s actions as offensive and as the initiator,
while Washington and the British viewed the French’s actions as offensive, making France the
initiator. This difference would have major diplomatic repercussions in future bargaining.
After winning the skirmish, Washington retreated to the trading post and constructed Fort
Necessity. By doing so, Washington had fully removed French troops from the region in a clear
offensive manner. However, the French quickly returned with a larger force with cannon, and
overwhelmed Washington’s forces at the fort in another clear offensive action.11 The most
critical aspect of the conflict at Fort Necessity was not the actual battle, but the surrender
document. In a letter published in the Maryland Gazette, a British officer with George
Washington described the complexity of the surrender document. First, the actual surrender
document was poorly written on a wet piece of paper with little light for the British to fully read
the document.12 As a result, the British had little idea of what they were signing within the actual
document. Within the document, the French asserted that the British were the aggressor at
Jumonville’s Glen, and had been responsible for the assassination of a French diplomat. From
the British perspective this was simply false, as described in the newspaper: “every officer then
present, is willing to declare, there was no such word as assassination mentioned; the terms
expressed to us were ‘the death of Jumonville’. If it had been mentioned; we could have got it
altered”. 13
 Cleary, there was a sharp difference in opinion over who was the aggressor in the
conflict. The French also included in the surrender document a mandate that the British could not
settle in the Ohio country. Once again, the British officer denied this claim in the newspaper,
stating, “whereby we obliged ourselves not to attempt an establishment beyond the mountains:
10
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this was translated to us: ‘not to attempt buildings or improvements, on the lands of his most
Christian majesty.’ This we never intended; but denied that he had any lands there, and therefore
thought it needless to dispute that point.”14 Once again, this shows that the French believed the
British were conducting offensive actions by encroaching on French territory, while the British
blatantly disagreed with this claim. Since these first initial conflicts were relatively small in
nature and occurred mainly between militia forces from the respective colonies neither France
nor Britain declared war after news of the conflicts reached Europe. Instead, there was only
diplomatic uproar from the French over the death of their diplomat, while the British maintained
that they had done nothing wrong. However, it was quite clear to both sides that the conflict was
escalating and on the path to war.
Britain was determined to respond to the French victories in the Ohio region after the
fallout from the surrender at Fort Necessity. To do so, they sent four regular British regiments
led by Major General Edward Braddock to North America. In addition, the British made no
effort to conceal these aggressive actions from the French. After finding out about the British
troop movements, France immediately responded by deploying nearly eighty companies of
infantry.15 The French response clearly surpassed Britain's initial troop movement, as they sent
six regiments of French regulars compared to Britain's four regiments. Once Britain found out
about the French counter-response, they ordered the Royal Navy to intercept the French fleet and
stop it from reaching North America. On June 8th, 1755, the Royal Navy captured the Alcide and
the Lys, who were carrying ten French companies.16 Clearly, both sides were intent on defending
their colonial empires in North America.
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After reaching North America, Braddock and his forces quickly marched to capture Fort
Duquesne, the French fort that had been established on the original site of the first British
settlement in the Ohio region. However, a mere six miles from the fort, the British forces were
ambushed by French troops and their Native American allies.17 With the element of surprise and
the aid of Native American allies, the French quickly defeated General Braddock and his forces,
and forced the British back to the thirteen colonies. To make matters worse in regards to the
prospects of war, Braddock was killed in the fighting, as detailed by one of his officers: “General
Braddock who was in the heat of the action the whole time, was greatly exposed; he had 4 horses
shot under him and shot through several parts his clothes; at the latter end of the affair an
unlucky shot hit him in the body which occasioned his death in 3 or 4 days afterwards.”18 After
this major battle between French and British regular forces, and the death of a British Major
General, war was seemingly inevitable. For many historians, this battle marked the first official
battle of the French and Indian War, as British and French regulars were now in open conflict in
North America. As historian Fred Anderson put it, “Thus began.. the most widespread war
British North America had ever known”.19
Historical Background Information: Prestige and Economic Motivations
Before delving into an analysis of the political theory behind the causes of the French and
Indian War, it is important to understand the historical background information behind the
timeline of events. The individual colonies, the geography of the region, the characteristics of the
French and British empires, and Native Americans played a crucial role in the build-up to
conflict. To begin, both the British and the French saw their colonies as possessions of grave
importance for their respective empires. European states viewed colonies across the world as a
17
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measure of power and prestige, while also providing valuable economic opportunities.20
According to historian William Thompson, these economic opportunities provided incentives to
risk conflict. Thompson notes that “the pressure for commercial and colonial gain went beyond a
governmental shift toward a foreign policy of naval and imperial mercantilism, especially in
Britain. The Seven Years’ War was about not only the wastes of Canada, but also its furs, the
fish of Newfoundland, the sugar of the West Indies, and the trade of West Africa and India.”21
Simply put, European states were more powerful politically and economically if they had more
colonies. As a result, European nations began a massive rush to found, secure, and defend
colonies across the globe. The importance of colonies played a key role in the build-up to the
French and Indian War, as both the British and French recognized the political, and especially
economic, importance of their respective colonies in North America. To conclude, the economic
importance and political prestige of colonies played an important role in the looming conflict
between Great Britain and France by increasing the stakes of the conflict and deepening the
resolve of both countries in bargaining.
Historical Background Information: Geography
Geography shaped the development of the British and French colonies, specifically in
regards to economic development and territorial expansion, and ultimately influenced the causes
of the French and Indian War. France’s colonies were concentrated in present-day Canada and
the Great Lakes region, as well as in present-day Louisiana and on the Mississippi River, while
Britain’s colonies were clustered along the Atlantic seaboard from present-day Maine to
Georgia. Thus, the French colonies surrounded the British colonies and prevented their westward
expansion. From the perspective of French officials, such as the governor of New France Barrin
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de la Galissonière, this made the French colonies crucially important to prevent British
hegemony in North America. Galissonière observed, “all that precedes sufficiently demonstrates
that it is of the utmost importance and of absolute necessity not to omit any means, nor spare any
expense to secure Canada, inasmuch as that is the only way to wrest America from the ambition
of the English.”22 The British recognized this French advantage prior to conflict and
acknowledged France’s strategic advantage of geographically surrounding the British and having
inroads further into the continent.23 As bargaining began between Britain and France, these
elements of imperial geography would have a massive impact on the status of the Ohio country
as an indivisible issue in the present and the future.
The other major geographical aspect of the French and Indian War emerged in the land
between the British and French colonies: the Ohio country. For both the British and the French,
the Ohio country was crucially important. Both states viewed the region as the key to colonizing
the modern-day states of Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois, controlling the fur
trade of the region, and linking the waterways of the Great Lakes region to the Mississippi River
and thus the Gulf of Mexico. As a result, the Ohio country became known as the region that
“held the key to the entire continent.”24 The French did not view the Ohio country as a place for
settlement in the near future, as their sole goal was to keep this region out of British hands and
maintain the fastest line of communication between their colonies in Canada and Louisiana.25
The British were much more focused on expanding their colonies on the Atlantic seaboard by
pushing new settlers into the Ohio country. The French knew this and used it to recruit Native
Americans to their side by warning the Native Americans of the dangers of British settlements
Barren De La Galissonière, Roland-Michel. “A French Colonial Official Sizes Up the British, 1751.” The Seven Years’ War in North America:
A Brief History with Documents. Timothy Shannon, Bedford, 2014, 33-35.
23
Shannon, Timothy. The Seven Years’ War in North America: A Brief History with Documents.  B
 oston, Bedford, 2014, 8.
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while emphasizing the importance of French trade. For instance, the governor of New France
Barrin de la Galissonière said to the Shawnee, Delaware, and Haudenosaunee tribes in a letter
wooing them to the French side, “I know the English only inspire you with evil sentiments, and,
besides, intend through their establishments on the Beautiful [Ohio] River.”26 The Ohio country
was critical for westward settlement for the British, and critical for the French to contain the
British and maintain communication between Louisiana and Canada. Eventually, the importance
of the Ohio country played a divisive role in bargaining between the French and the British prior
to the outbreak of conflict. As historian Max Savelle observed, “the Ohio valley was the point of
greatest tension, and if that problem could be solved other disputes might be taken up at
leisure.”27 The geography of the Ohio country played a critical role in the build-up to the French
and Indian War, as the geography of the region made the Ohio country an indivisible issue and
led to a breakdown in bargaining between the French and the British.
Historical Background Information: The Colonies
The French colonies in North America prior to the French and Indian War were
concentrated in present-day Canada and Louisiana. The colonies in Canada, called New France,
were the heart of the French colonial empire in North America as a result of their larger
population and greater economic importance. New France had about 55,000 settlers spread out
across Canada and the Great Lakes region with its capital in Quebec, providing a relatively weak
economic base.28 Despite--or, perhaps, because of--its small population, New France cultivated
strong relationships with Native Americans through marriages, trade, and missionaries.29 Given
this relatively small presence in North America, French administrators in New France realized
Céloron, Pierre-Joseph. “Onontio in the Ohio Country, 1749.” The Seven Years’ War in North America: A Brief History with Documents.
Timothy Shannon, Bedford, 2014, 29-32.
27
Savelle, Max. “Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Seven Years’ War in America.” The Canadian Historical Review 20 no. 1, (1939): 26.
26
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the importance of keeping the British settlers in check. In 1749, the governor of New France,
Barrin de la Galissonière prepared to defend the small French colony against the growing British
colonies, as he firmly believed in the importance of preventing new British westward settlements
to protect the future of New France.30 In addition to expanding trade with Native Americans and
recruiting new settlers to the colony, the French prioritized halting British expansion into the
Ohio country prior to the French and Indian War.
From the British perspective, the French efforts to hem in their colonies and recruit
Native Americans were direct attempts to halt the progress and development of their colonies
along the Atlantic seaboard. For the British, westward expansion was crucial to continue the
economic development and population growth of their colonies. France’s colonies clearly
prevented this long-term goal. British colonial official Archibald Kennedy summed up the
British perspective in a 1754 report on colonial affairs, writing that “the French are now drawing
a line among the borders of our settlements in every province, and building forts to secure the
most convenient passes on the lakes, that form the communication; by which they will
effectually cut off all intercourse and traffic, between us and the Indians inhabiting the inland
31
countries.”
French efforts to secure their own colonial borders hampered British expansion

west and represented a direct threat to British interests. At the same time, the British had
concerns regarding France’s strong relationship with Native American nations. The French
favored trade with the Native Americans, rather than pushing for permanent French settlements.
When the French and their Native allies attacked rogue British settlements on the frontier, their
objective was to destroy British settlements to protect their trading interests.32 For the British,
30
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these French actions threatened their westward expansion by impeding future British settlements.
The British viewed the French colonies as restricting the economic and population growth of
their own colonies, and as a danger due to their recruitment of Native American allies and
encouragement of Native American attacks along the British frontier.
In contrast to the French colonies, the British colonies were larger, more profitable, and
of greater economic importance to Great Britain. The thirteen British colonies along the Atlantic
seaboard had about 1,600,000 settlers and were one of Great Britain’s most important trading
partners.33 Unlike the French, the British were tremendously focused on settlements and growing
their colonies’ population. As a result, the British looked to expand westward with a focus on
trade instead of settlement. When asked by the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo nations about the
British’s plan for the Ohio country, British General Edward Braddock affirmed the British desire
for expansion and new settlements in spite of the current settlements of Native Americans. He
stated “that the English should inhabit and inherit the land…. On which General Braddock said
that no savage should inherit the land.”34 The British were much more focused on founding new
settlements, while the French were more focused on expanding trade. As a result, the two sides
were set up to have conflict over the Ohio country, as Britain and France clearly had different
preferences for the future of the region. In the long run, this contributed to a breakdown in
bargaining between the two states. In addition, the French were aware of the British desire to
colonize the Ohio country, and used it to recruit Native Americans to their side, as shown by a
speech made by French officer Pierre-Joseph Céloron to various tribes in 1749: “Undoubtedly
you are not aware of the establishments which they propose making thereon, which tend nothing
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short of your total ruin.”35 The British, the French, and the many Native American nations were
thus all aware of the purpose of the British colonies: expansion and continued economic growth
through westward settlement.
From the French perspective, the growing economic strength and population size of the
British colonies directly threatened the future growth and expansion of their own colonies. In
1751, the former governor of New France Barrin de la Galissonière wrote a memoir that
provided key insight into the French views of the British colonies. For one, Galissonière
acknowledged the strength of the British colonies, which he accurately believed was increasingly
daily, and that the colonies were to the British “as dear to [the British] as they are precious.”36
Thus, it is clear that the French recognized the importance of the British colonies to Great
Britain. At the same time, the French knew the impact of the British colonies on the future of
their own colonies. If New France was to expand territorially and economically, it had to halt the
rise of their rivals to the south. Galissonière continued to express his concerns about the
expanding British colonies, “[w]hich, if means be not found to prevent it, will soon absorb not
only all the Colonies located in the neighboring islands of the Tropic, but even all those of the
Continent of America.”37 Clearly, Galissonière was afraid that the rise of the British colonies
would destroy the French colonial empire in North America, as France would no longer be able
to compete with the growing and expanding British colonies. For this reason, Galissonière
asserted that the French must check the British. However, despite his acknowledgement of the
British strength, Galissonière believed in France’s ability and the unique geographic position of
New France to stop the rise of the British colonies.38 As time went on, this perspective led the
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French to develop an aggressive and highly resolved mentality in bargaining prior to the
outbreak of conflict.
Historical Background Information: Native Americans
Besides the British and the French empires, the third major actor in the build-up to the
French and Indian War were Native Americans. Although they were not directly involved in
bargaining or negotiations, Native Americans played a crucial role in the events prior to the war.
The two major groups involved with the French and the British were the Haudenosaunee in the
Great Lakes and New England region, and the Shawnee, Delaware and parts of the
Haudenosaunee in the Ohio country. The Haudenosaunee were a powerful Indigenous
confederacy made up of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca tribes. Powerful
traders, they had established neutrality with the French and the British to continue trading with
both sides.39 The Ohio nations included the Delaware, Shawnee, and parts of the Haudenosaunee,
and had significantly less contact with the French and the British due to the vastness of the Ohio
country and lack of European settlers in the region.40 Despite cultural and familial kinship, the
Haudenosaunee, Delaware, and Shawnee remained independent nations who respected each
others’ sovereignty and made independent decisions for the good of their people. However, both
groups certainly shared a similar goal: keeping European settlers out of their lands while
increasing trade with both the British and the French. For many Native Americans, trade with the
British and French was a profitable exercise that allowed them access to European goods in
exchange for furs. Due to this trade, the Haudenosaunee, Delaware, and others had built up
significant power and influence in the region, and were viewed as important allies to both the
British and the French. Historian Timothy Shannon echoes this rising agency and power of the
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various tribes of the region, as he wrote, “by the early eighteenth century, such Indians were
forging new political alliances by taking other native groups into their orbit and using their
numbers to augment their own power.”41 This newfound power made them a crucial player in the
build-up to the French and Indian War, as both the British and the French had to factor in the
power of Indigenous tribes when calculating their own strength and resolve in bargaining.
Since the arrival of European colonizers, the Haudenosaunee, Delaware, and Shawnee
had always used trade with furs to gain access to European goods, such as weapons. As time
went on, this trade became essential for the Native Americans, and a necessary requirement for
good relations with the French and British. In a speech to French officials, a Haudenosaunee
chief echoed this necessity, as he told the French officials that they had “expelled the English
from this territory, and to this we heartily agree; but you ought to bring with you traders to
furnish us with what we need.”42 As the French and British colonies grew, settlers began to
venture further and further westward into lands inhabited by Native Americans. For native
nations, this expansion was simply unacceptable, and led them to pursue various agreements and
treaties with colonial governors to prevent the expansion of European settlers.43 However, as the
population of the colonies grew, more and more settlers began to move westward in search of
new lands and new economic opportunities. Eventually, it became clear that the colonial
authorities had little power or resolve to restrain the expansion of settlers into Native American
lands. Thus, the westward expansion of settlers into Native American lands quickly became a
dire problem for Native Americans, and they began to threaten conflict against the settlers. These
sentiments were expressed by British officials such as Richard Peters, who, when discussing the

41
42

Ibid, 9-10.

Céloron, Pierre-Joseph. “Onontio in the Ohio Country, 1749”, 32.

Peters, Richard. “Tensions between Squatters and Indians, 1750.” The Seven Years’ War in North America: A Brief History with Documents.
Timothy Shannon, Bedford, 2014, 41.
43

Althouse 17

issue of squatters on the frontier, stated, “That if we did not in this journey entirely remove these
people, it would not be in the power of the government to prevent an Indian war.”44 The Native
Americans simply had little choice but to threaten armed conflict, as the colonial governments
failed to prevent the westward expansion of settlers.
As a result of the British focus on permanent settlements and poor relationships with the
various tribes of the region, the French had a much easier time recruiting Native American allies.
For example, when meeting with the Delaware tribe to discuss the issue of British settlements on
Native American lands, British General Edward Braddock insisted that the British had the right
to take full control of these lands and refused any help to drive out the French or enemy tribes.45
This policy was simply unacceptable to the Delaware, and when they heard this they
immediately abandoned the British. While describing the situation, a member of the Delaware
tribe wrote “on which Shingas with the other chiefs went away from General Braddock to the
people to whom they communicated what had passed between them and Braddock, at which they
were very much enraged and a party of them went immediately upon it and joined the French.”46
For the British, the inability to recruit Native American allies coupled with the French’s ability to
win over Native Americans led to serious concerns amidst colonial administrators. British
colonial officer Archibald Kennedy echoed this sentiment in an article analyzing the French
colonies in 1754, writing, “if we intend to convince them [the Indians] that we are really in
earnest, and that they should fight for us, we must fight along with them, and always to have
some of our people to head their parties; the French seldom fail of this method.”47 While visiting
a French fort in the Ohio country, George Washington described a similar feeling in his personal
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journal, as he described watching the French try to recruit Native American allies away from the
British as the following: “I can’t say that ever in my life I suffered so much anxiety as I did in
this affair.”48 To conclude, the British had serious worries about France’s ability to recruit Native
Americans to the French cause, which had a key impact on their perspective of French military
strength, especially in the Ohio country, in bargaining prior to the outbreak of conflict.
As conflict escalated between the British and the French, the Native Americans continued
to play an important role in the situation as key actors in the escalating offensive actions and
brinkmanship game from both states. Native Americans, particularly those allied to the French,
began to escalate their attacks along the frontier and against trading posts run by the British.
French-allied Native Americans attacked British-allied tribes, and targeted those with especially
close relations to the British. In in his personal journal, British trader William Trent illustrated
this violence when he described the murder of an English-backed chief, as he wrote, “one of
them, the old Pianguisha king, called by the English Old Britain, who, for his attached to the
English, they boiled and eat him all up.”49 In the Battle of Monongahela, the final conflict before
war was officially declared, Native American tactics gave the French the decisive victory needed
to make war inevitable: “These Indians from their irregular method of fighting by running from
one place to another obliged us to wheel from right to left, to desert the guns and then hastily to
return and cover them.”50 To conclude, Native Americans played a crucial role in the build-up to
the French and Indian War by becoming a major source of offensive actions in the brinkmanship
game between the French and the British.
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Political Theory
There are several theories within political science that can be used, in combination with
an analysis of the historical background information, to determine the causes of the French and
Indian War. As discussed earlier, previous literature has focused primarily on the security
dilemma and the spiral method of war and peace to analyze the causes of the French and Indian
War. The current study disagrees with this prior assessment of the causes of war. Instead, the
current study believes that the causes of the French and Indian War are best viewed through the
bargaining theory of war. In this model, asymmetric information with an incentive to
misrepresent combined with the presence of an indivisible issue led to a breakdown in bargaining
between the French and the British. With the addition of offensive brinkmanship actions by both
sides, colonial conflict was inevitable in North America.
Indivisible Issue: The Ohio Country
The bargaining theory of war was established by James Fearon in his 1995 paper
Rationalist Explanations for War. In this theory, two states bargain between each other in an
attempt to avoid war. Various factors, such as the enemy’s strength, personal resolve, future
power, and the costs of war, impact whether war is declared or if a peaceful agreement is
reached.51 Within the framework of the bargaining theory of war, an indivisible issue can cause a
breakdown in bargaining and lead to conflict because neither actor can agree to a compromise
over the issue. If there is an indivisible issue in bargaining, a successful bargaining is highly
unlikely.52 In terms of bargaining, this makes indivisible issues incredibly important, as they
make successful bargaining very difficult to achieve since both sides are extremely reluctant to
compromise on the issue. In the process of negotiating for a settlement, Britain and France were
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faced with an indivisible issue in bargaining: the Ohio region. The current study asserts that the
Ohio country’s status as an indivisible issue, combined with the presence of asymmetric
information, led to a breakdown in bargaining and eventually war between the French and the
British in North America.
For an issue to be indivisible, it has to meet three basic criteria, according to Ron Hassner
in To Have and To Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility. The
first is integrity: “The parties must hold that the issue cannot be parceled out or subdivided
without significantly diminishing its subjective value.”53 To both sides, the Ohio region could not
be divided without significantly diminishing its value. For the French, their policy had always
been that the region was in the French sphere of interest and that the British had no right to settle
there. As historian Richard Smoke explains, “to the French it seemed that the English colonists
were beginning to trespass on an area that had long been under French influence.”54 The French
also viewed the region as critical to their interests in expanding their colonial empire in North
America, as they believed that the development of New France and Louisiana depended on
maintaining the link between the two colonies. If this link was severed through British control of
the Ohio country, the French would lose their fastest line of communication between New
France and Louisiana, and their trade with Native Americans would drastically suffer. Historian
William Nester detailed this French perspective in his novel on the war, as he wrote that
“practically, they [the French] could not accept a plan which granted Britain the forks of the
Ohio and allowed its traders access to the Ohio River country, thus putting at risk
communications between Canada and Louisiana.”55 French administrators and diplomats were
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well aware of this, as seen through the policies of Barrin de la Galissonière, the governor of New
France. In 1749, the governor warned 
“[t]hat breach must be closed and the British forced to
remain behind the mountains, because, once located on the upper waters either of the St.
Lawrence system or the Mississippi, Great Britain would be able easily to break the line of
communication between Canada and Louisiana, and to strike with disastrous results at either
one.”56 Even if the region was split in half, the French were worried that an influx of British
settlers would eventually pour into the French side and render it essentially British. Thus, France
did not view the region as divisible, as they feared that any split would result in full British
control of the territory and the severing of the crucial link between their colonies.
On the other hand, the British recognized that without the Ohio region, their colonies
would never be able to expand westward. Historian Richard Smoke detailed this British
perspective and dilemma, as he wrote that “the British found it absurd that New France and
Louisiana, sparsely settled even in their own territories and with comparatively poor and
slow-growing economies, should try to deny the Ohio region to the energetic, richer, and more
ambitious, and vastly more numerous English colonists.”57 If the Ohio region was divided, the
British felt that their westward settlement would be contained, as the French would simply draw
a different line in the sand to prevent British settlements. To the British, they felt that they had
the right to control and settle all of the Ohio country, and that full control of the territory was the
only way to guarantee the necessary expansion of their ever-growing colonies along the Atlantic
seaboard. Thus, both the British and the French agreed on the integrity of the Ohio region and its
lessened value if divided.
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The second criteria for an issue to be labeled as indivisible is the boundaries of the
territory. According to Hassner, “the parties must mean the same thing when they refer to the
issue they are bargaining over.”58 Neither side had exactly the same boundaries for the Ohio
region, due to the reality of the time period and the lack of accurate and shared maps. However,
both Britain and France clearly agreed on what general region was being contested, even if the
boundaries were not concrete and clear on a shared map. According to historian Walter
Borneman, the French and the British agreed that “between this line of French forts and the crest
of the Appalachians 300 to 400 miles to the east, however, was a tremendous expanse of territory
drained principally by the Ohio River and its tributaries.”59 For both sides, this land was clearly
the disputed territory known as the Ohio country, even if there were no exact maps to confirm
the exact boundaries.
For the final criteria for an issue to be indivisible, Hassner says the following: “The
parties must believe that the issue cannot be substituted for or exchanged for something of equal
value.”60 This means that neither side could be bought off by side-payments or exchanges of
other land for the Ohio country. As mentioned before, both sides realized the importance of the
Ohio country and had no intention of dividing or giving up the area. For the French, the region
was simply too important for trade and to maintain the link between New France and Louisiana.
For the British, the region was simply too important for the future of westward expansion from
their colonies along the Atlantic seaboard. As a result, the Ohio country simply could not be
exchanged for anything else, even if it meant risking war. Historian Geoffrey Blainey
summarized this mentality best in his book The Causes of War: “for the English and French
governments the colonies were the first priority and peace was second. And if there was conflict
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between the two priorities, the colonies won and peace lost.”61 Simply put, no compromise on the
Ohio country was possible, which meant that there would be a breakdown in bargaining that
could lead to conflict. Even as the conflict escalated, neither side changed their mentality in
bargaining. For example, historian William Nester described one British proposal as “essentially
an ultimatum to the French to abandon their historic and economic stake throughout the Ohio
River valley or else be prepared for war. This the French were unprepared to do. The gap
between the two positions appeared unbridgeable. As one French minister put it, ‘War alone can
end our differences...If they are determined at London to kindle a war, all we can say to forestall
that evil will not prevent it.’”62 To conclude, the Ohio country was an indivisible issue and a
cause of the French and Indian War, as it clearly contributed to a breakdown in bargaining
between the French and the British.
Indivisible Issue: Impact on Future Bargaining
Prior to the outbreak of conflict, the Ohio country’s status as an indivisible issue created
further problems in bargaining when analyzing the impact of the region on future bargaining
between France and Britain. The basic logic of future bargaining is that any bargain made today
will have an impact on bargains in the future. In short, if the Ohio country was divided, it would
have a direct impact on the probability of winning a war in the future, which would in turn have
a direct impact on future bargaining. 
Political scientists Thomas Chadefaux and James Fearon’s
findings on the impact of indivisible issues on future bargaining provide the core basis for the
analysis behind this section and provide strong evidence for the Ohio country’s status as an
indivisible issue when viewed through the lens of future bargaining. Essentially, if a bargain is
reached on the indivisible issue, then that bargain would have an impact on future bargaining
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between the French and the British. In some situations, such as the sharing of territory, this can
help lead to peace by removing rapid shifts in relative power between two states in the present
and in the future. As described by Chadefaux, “by sharing territory – a latent source of power –
more or less equally among relevant players, this system avoided rapid shifts in relative power,
and equally important, potential future shifts in relative power.”63 At first glance, this may
support the idea that an equal division of the Ohio country would be the best mechanism to
achieve peace between the French and the British in the short term. However, when analyzing
the impact of such a division, it is equally important to take into account the impact of the
distribution of benefits on future power.64 From this angle, the Ohio country appears to be even
more indivisible, as future bargaining would be dramatically impacted by any division. For
example, the division of territory, such as the Ohio country, has a direct impact on the
probability of winning a war in the future, as detailed by Chadefaux who wrote that “intuitively,
this means that issues that affect utility (e.g. territory) also affect the probability of winning a war
(a territory can be used for a larger population and hence army, or for a larger production
base).”65 To summarize, any division of the Ohio country would have a dramatic impact on
future bargaining between the French and the British.
When viewing the impact of any division of the Ohio country on future bargaining, it is
clear that the Ohio country becomes an even more strategic issue for the French, which makes
them more resistant to any division of the territory. If the Ohio country was divided into British
and French sections, the British would be able to rapidly grow and fortify their section of the
Ohio country because of their larger population size and more accessible resources, while the
French would have little ability to match this investment in their section of the Ohio country. The
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British would then be able to demand more in future bargaining from the French. Chadefaux
summarizes this logic when he writes, “because territory is not just directly valuable but can also
be used to generate military resources, a deal struck today may affect the terms of deals struck in
the future. In particular, conceding territory to another state may allow it to grow stronger
militarily and so to demand yet more in the future.”66 Clearly, the French would want to avoid
any scenario where the British would be able to demand more in the future, and with greater
strength in resources and the Ohio country. Simply put, any division of the Ohio country would
increase Britain’s military strength, which would have a corresponding impact on how the
British would act in future bargaining according to the theory. Fearon illustrates this point when
he writes, “this result stems from the fact that with discrete issue resolutions any concession
yields a discontinuous change in a state’s future military prospects, which in turn determines
how the state fares in future bargaining.”67 Simply put, the French would not approve of an
increase of Britain’s military strength in North America. As a result, the Ohio country becomes
even more of an indivisible issue for the French when you analyze the impact of the region on
future bargaining between the British and the French.
Given the Ohio country’s status as a geographical indivisible issue, there are even more
implications for its impact on future bargaining. James Fearon specifically discusses this issue in
his paper “Bargaining Over Objects That Influence Future Bargaining Power.” In general,
Fearon asserts that contested territory can be an indivisible issue when viewed through the lens
of future bargaining: “the set of issue resolutions over which the players are bargaining might be
effectively discrete rather than continuous. For various technological or political reasons,
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contested stretches of territory might be effectively indivisible.”68 The Ohio country was a
discrete issue in the build-up to the French and Indian War, as it was the central region where
conflict was brewing prior to the outbreak of hostilities. As described before, there are plenty of
political reasons for why the region was indivisible, which thus makes it indivisible in future
bargaining according to Fearon. Fearon even takes it a step further, as he brings in the element of
military advantages created by geography: “discontinuities might arise for ‘strategic’ territory,
meaning territory that is positioned or shaped in such a way as to confer large military
advantages on whoever controls it.”69 Given the Ohio region’s position between France’s
colonies of New France and Louisiana and directly westward of Britain’s colonies along the
Atlantic seaboard, it is clear that the region would confer large military advantages for whoever
controls it. As a result, whoever controlled the region would have a massive advantage in future
bargaining. Since the French knew that any division would lead to British dominance of the
region and thus military advantages, they could simply not afford to agree to any division of the
Ohio country. As a result, the Ohio country is clearly an indivisible issue, and even more
important when viewed through the lens of future bargaining.
In the short-term, the Ohio country was an indivisible issue for both the British and the
French. The French could not allow the British into the Ohio country, for fear of losing the vital
connection between their colonies in Louisiana and New France, as well as their lucrative trading
connections with Native Americans in the region. For the British, French control of all or any
section of the Ohio region would prevent the simplest means of westward expansion for their
rapidly growing colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. From the British perspective, this was simply
non-negotiable, as the continued economic development and population growth of their colonies
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depended on westward expansion. Finally, when considering future bargaining, whoever gained
the better share would have the upper hand in future bargaining situations. For the French, the
impact of future bargaining was even more dramatic, as any division of the Ohio country would
likely lead to future British dominance of the region. As a result, the Ohio country was clearly an
indivisible issue that led to a breakdown in bargaining prior to conflict. Prominent historians,
such as William Thompson and and William Nester, have firmly agreed with this assertion
regarding the region: “hostilities began over control of the Ohio River basin in 1754”70 and “the
upper Ohio region...claimed by the Six Nations by conquest, the British colonies by charter, the
French crown by discovery, and various American Indian tribes by occupancy. It was the
inability of those concerned to resolve their conflicting claims that provoked the French and
Indian War.”71 Based on all of this evidence, the Ohio region’s status as an indivisible issue was
a clear cause of the French and Indian War.
Bargaining Theory of War: Asymmetric Information
Within the bargaining theory of war, James Fearon established that asymmetric
information, information that is secret or unknown to one actor in the bargaining framework,
with an incentive to misrepresent can be a cause of war.72 Essentially, one state has private
information about their strength. If their opponent believes that state is weak due to private
information, but they are actually strong, war is likely. States have an incentive to misrepresent
information because private information “might affect the outcome of war and consequently their
relative bargaining power”.73 The presence of this asymmetric information creates uncertainty,
over matters such as resolve or military strength, in bargaining between the two states. Thus,
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asymmetric information with an incentive to misrepresent can cause a breakdown in bargaining,
and lead to war, when no peaceful settlement can be reached between the two states due to the
presence of this uncertainty.
In the 18th century, good intelligence and the ability to transmit that information quickly
were non-existent. As a result, the buildup to the French and Indian War was filled with
asymmetric information, which prevented the French and the British from even coming close to
a successful and peaceful bargain. To begin, Britain had asymmetric information about their
strength, as the French had little knowledge about the sheer quantity of men, supplies, and
resources that Britain could pull from their colonies.74 France knew that the British colonies had
more settlers and resources than New France, but they certainly did not fully comprehend the
sheer amount of power Britain could extract from its colonies. If the French had known this, they
would have likely proposed a reasonable bargain to avoid the costs of war. On the flip side, the
French had asymmetric information about their strength as well, as the British failed to realize
truly how little resources, manpower, and economic strength New France had.75 Instead of
proposing a bargain that France would likely accept, Britain bargained like New France was a
strong power and offered unrealistic offers that France could never accept. Theoretically, if
Britain thought that France was strong, they should have offered France a better offer that France
would have likely accepted. However, this did not happen because of the inexperience and poor
decision-making of the British diplomats. In addition, if Britain had known about the true
weakness of New France, they could have offered a much more feasible offer that France would
have likely accepted. Once again, because of their inexperienced diplomatic corps, Britain
instead acted as if France would be unwilling to truly negotiate because of their strength. The
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British position was further complicated because despite the fact that New France was relatively
weak, France was significantly stronger in the Ohio country, as the French had more troops,
resources, and forts in the area compared to the British.76 This element made the overall situation
even more complicated and added another layer of asymmetric information, as there was a clear
difference in France’s potential strength overall versus their immediate strength at the time. As a
result, even though the French knew about their own weakness in New France, the French
refused to accept an agreement that ceded the Ohio country to the British because of their
superiority in the territory at the time of negotiations. Clearly, the asymmetric information
present regarding strength and resolve complicated bargaining between the French and the
British prior to the French and Indian War.
In the build-up to the French and Indian War, the frontier skirmishes between French and
British forces did little to resolve the asymmetric information regarding the enemy’s strength and
resolve. In general, the officers in both armies were badly informed about their opponent’s
capabilities: little was known about the enemy’s proposed actions, troop size, intentions, and
resolve.77 In the Indigenous-controlled landscape of North America, good information was
simply hard to find. Specifically in the Ohio country, there was an incredibly limited colonial
presence throughout the region even when compared to the rest of North America. Thus, there
was no status quo colonial division in the region, which created a scramble for uncolonized land
in a series of inherent offensive actions. Neither the French nor the British government in Europe
was well-informed to make crucial decisions, as there were simply relatively few sources of
information.78 Both Britain and France made little effort to solve instances of asymmetric
information, as described by historian Richard Smoke when he wrote, “neither in Paris nor in
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London did policy-makers make an effort to bring lower-ranking individuals familiar with the
Ohio region back to the capital for consultation.”79 Britain and France had no incentives to reveal
any asymmetric information about their uncertainties in North America, as it would severely
weaken their bargaining power in negotiations. If France revealed that New France had little
resources, manpower, and economic strength, Britain would offer a significantly less appealing
offer to the French. If the British had revealed their uncertainty about France’s resolve and
strength, it would have emboldened the French to demand more concessions in bargaining. As a
result, both the British and the French remained uncertain over the other’s strength and resolve in
the build-up to the outbreak of the French and Indian War.
The presence of asymmetric information with an incentive to misrepresent can lead to a
breakdown in bargaining, which in turn can lead to the outbreak of war. In terms of the actual
bargaining, a summary of the negotiations will be provided later in the current study. To
summarize, the rampant prevalence of asymmetric information for all actors must be
emphasized, as described by historian Timothy Shannon when he wrote, “in all the sources in
this chapter, key figures involved in the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War - British, French, and
Indian - struggle to act on incomplete information.”80 The French and the British were both
unaware of the other’s resolve, military strength, and resources. Even the Native Americans were
relatively unsure about what colonial power they should side with in the face of asymmetric
information.”81 As a result, neither side had a clear image of the other’s objectives. Historian
Timothy Shannon brilliantly described this dilemma when he wrote, “whether making
split-second decisions on the battlefield or conceiving strategies after deliberate consideration,
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82
none of these actors was able to comprehend fully the motives or objectives of the others.”
The

inability to comprehend the other side’s motives or objectives dramatically impacted bargaining,
as both the British and French struggled to find a peaceful bargain without knowledge of these
two critical aspects. To conclude, when the French and the British attempted to achieve a
peaceful bargain to stop the escalating conflict, the presence of asymmetric information with an
incentive to misrepresent created uncertainty over the other’s resolve, strength, and objectives,
which prevented any real chance at a successful and peaceful bargain.
Breakdown in Bargaining
In addition to the presence of asymmetric information and an indivisible issue in the Ohio
country, the realities of 18th century diplomacy also played an important role in the breakdown
in bargaining that led to the outbreak of the French and Indian War. To begin, Britain and France
were both ruled by monarchs who faced tremendous political pressure to be successful rulers of
their nation.83 In Britain, this pressure came from members of Parliament, as members of
Parliament could check and hinder King George II if they deemed him unsuccessful. In France,
this political pressure came mostly from French nobles, as these nobles could directly threaten
the reign of King Louis XV if they disagreed with his policies and decision-making. Success was
measured in various ways, such as the size of one’s colonial empire, military success, and
relative status compared to one’s rivals. Given their geographic proximity and history, this put
Great Britain and France in direct competition with one another. For the French King Louis XV,
this led to the adoption of an aggressive mentality to appear strong and powerful. A French
official summarized this perspective when he wrote in his journal that ‘his Majesty eagerly
wishes for peace… but if he is forced to make war he will fear neither the expense nor the
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danger”.84 This mentality had a direct impact on the foreign policy of the British, as it forced
them to match the French resolve or else appear weak. In addition, most British diplomats
believed that France wanted another war, which led them to be even more aggressive in
bargaining. Historian Fred Anderson echoes this belief when describing the letters between
British diplomats, as he wrote, “he [British diplomat Thomas Pellam Holles] believed that Louis
XV and his ministers would not hesitate to start another war with Great Britain if they thought
they could gain by it.’”85 As a result, because of the impact of having a monarchical system of
government, both Britain and France acted aggressively in bargaining prior to the French and
Indian War, which helped lead to a breakdown in bargaining between the two states.
In North America, the posture of colonial leaders in both the British and French colonies
also contributed to the breakdown in bargaining and outbreak of conflict. Both French and
British colonial officials were heavily biased towards the war, as they saw a potential victory as a
mechanism to increase their own personal wealth and power. Specifically, Governor Duquesne
of New France, and Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia, who sent George Washington’s forces to
scout the French forts that sparked the first conflicts, had personal interests in the Ohio country
that led them to advocate for conflict. Duquesne would benefit from an expansion of trade in the
region, as he received a portion of taxes as governor, while Dinwiddie owned a part of the
Virginia company, the company that established the first British trading post in the Ohio
region.86 As a result, both colonial governors pushed for war in their reports back to Europe.
Both simply saw the opportunity to expand their personal wealth, as in their opinion, a victory
for their side in war would lead to a massive increase in profits. Historian Richard Smoke echoes
this assertion in his analysis on the causes of the war, as he wrote that “the real importance of the
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Ohio region and the significance of events therein were undoubtedly exaggerated in the reports
on which higher-level policy-makers partially based their decisions.”87 The mentality and actions
of British and French colonial leaders in North America helped lead to a breakdown in
bargaining by encouraging war in their reports back to Europe.
Besides the problems of biased government officials and aggressive monarchs, both
Britain and France had issues with their diplomatic corps. To begin, both sides had key
diplomats suddenly die in the early stages of negotiations in 1754. In London, Prime Minister
Henry Pelham, a crucial member of the long-standing Whig government died in March, while in
Paris, Foreign Minister François Dominique de Barberie de Saint Contest died in July. 88
 These
deaths in the French and British governments led each side to underestimate their opponent.
Historian Richard Smoke echoed this assertion in his analysis of the causes of the war, as he
wrote that “during 1754 policy-makers in both capitals saw the opposing regime as being
disorganized and more than usually engulfed in intragovernmental politics.”89 As a result of this
mentality, both sides offered aggressive and unrealistic offers in an attempt to take advantage of
the supposed weakened enemy. Neither the British nor the French had experienced diplomats
who desired peace to replace these key figures in bargaining, which led to aggressive offers and
unrealistic proposals that contributed to the breakdown in bargaining.
Within their own diplomatic corps, both countries had further problems that contributed
to a breakdown in bargaining. In France, foreign policy and diplomacy under Louis XV was
generally viewed as relatively ineffective: “French decision-making in this period, however, was
a maze of intrigue, in which secret continental diplomacy by some officials, unknown to others,
was also involved. The effect was to complicate and cloud all issues. With no first-rate statesman
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in French councils at this time, it is not surprising that the labyrinthine decision-making process
lumbered into an escalation sequence abroad.”90 Since the objectives of France’s foreign policy
were unclear and there were no first-rate diplomats in the French foreign ministry, the chances of
a peaceful settlement were drastically lowered. In Britain, many diplomats favored a more
aggressive approach instead of a peaceful settlement: “Although decision-making in London was
more rationalized, there was a war party that had a powerful and direct effect on policy.”91 Since
this war party had a powerful influence on foreign policy, it led to a more aggressive mentality
from the British in bargaining, and eventually unrealistic offers to the French. In addition, most
British diplomats believed that France wanted another war, which led them to be even more
aggressive in bargaining: “[the British] believed that Louis XV and his ministers would not
hesitate to start another war with Great Britain if they thought they could gain by it.”92 Once
again, this aggressive mentality created the conditions for unrealistic bargains that France could
simply not accept, as war was simply more attractive than giving up all of the Ohio country. All
in all, the nature of French and British government officials and diplomats heavily contributed to
the breakdown in negotiations that led to the French and Indian War.
In terms of the actual negotiations, the bargains presented by both the British and the
French had little chance of a peaceful settlement. Regardless of who was involved, the lack of
actual diplomacy was glaring: “No matter who was involved, the diplomats spent most of their
time either endlessly repeating their respective positions or indulging in equally endless rounds
93
of parties.”
Instead of actually trying to find a solution to the conflict, both sides seemed

content to retain their positions and refuse to compromise. As a result, both sides quickly

90
91
92
93

Ibid, 234.
Ibid.

Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War. 33.

Nester, William. The Great Frontier War: Britain, France, and the Imperial Struggle for North America, 1607-1755, 179.

Althouse 35

developed the mentality that a compromise was never possible, which undoubtedly increased the
chances of war in North America. Historian William Netser, when describing the issues in
bargaining between the French and the British, wrote that “after the first year of meetings it was
obvious to both sides they would remain deadlocked because their respective demands were
irreconcilable.”94 Clearly, the unwillingness to compromise from both the French and the British
helped to contribute to a breakdown in bargaining.
Despite this, there were some attempts at trying to find a peaceful settlement to the
territorial disputes in North America. However, as described by French diplomat Antoine Louis
Rouilleé in letters to other French diplomats, most of the British offers were simply unrealistic
from the French point of view. To begin, the British demand for a neutralization of the Ohio
country, as well as access to the Great Lakes, was impossible: “The British demand for the
neutralization of Ohio and the use of the Wabash as the western boundary of the neutral zone, he
insisted, would jeopardize both those lines of communication between Louisiana and Canada and
could never be accepted. As for the navigation of the lakes, one might as well demand the
cession of Canada entire, since these lakes lay in the very heart of that province.”95 France could
simply not afford to lose this vital link between Louisiana and New France. In addition, this
agreement would have massive implications for the future, as the French recognized that such an
agreement would put the British right on their doorstep in North America. According to historian
Max Sevelle, this bargain would put France in an impossible position in the future, as “for
France to accede to the British proposals would place England in a position in time of war to
seize almost without effort both Canada and Louisiana.”96 For the French, there were simply
three key issues that they could not compromise on in bargaining with the British: the British
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claims to the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, the British claims for access to the Bay of
Fundy between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and, most importantly, the British demands for
a neutral zone in the Ohio country. None of these claims by the British were deemed as
acceptable to the French, as showcased by the writings of Rouilleé: “if the British were not
willing to modify their demands on those three points, Rouillé considered it useless to negotiate
further.”97 However, because of their lack of experience, aggressive nature, and desire to
showcase strength, the British refused to retract these claims. As a result, because of the
continued bad bargains from the British and lack of desire to compromise from the French, a
breakdown in bargaining was inevitable.
Asymmetric information and the presence of the Ohio country as an indivisible issue also
had an impact on the bargains proposed by the British and the French. The presence of
asymmetric information with an incentive to misrepresent sparked an aggressive mentality from
both sides in an attempt to appear strong: “The English belligerents demanded what the French
moderates could not concede, and the French hard-liners forced responses that the English
moderates could not accept. Each side maneuvered for positions of strength that could not be
abandoned. Having achieved strength, each side had to use it.”98 As a result, both sides offered
bad bargains that the other side could not accept, partly because the diplomats involved had no
idea what a good bargain would be. Next, the Ohio country’s status as an indivisible issue left
each side with little room to compromise. Since France’s territorial claims to the region
fundamentally contrasted with Britain’s territorial claims, and vice versa, neither side had the
ability for compromise. Historian Max Savelle echoes this assertion in his analysis of the
negotiations between the French and the British, as he wrote that “the claims of the two countries
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were fundamentally opposite of each other, and apparently impossible of conciliation. This
became apparent to both sides by the end of 1751, and the history of the commission from that
time on is a history of dalliance and futile jockeying for position.”99 Instead of working to find a
compromise, both sides simply maintained their positions and refused to negotiate. This led to
continued futile bargaining with little chance of a peaceful settlement. By the end of the process,
it was clear that attempts at bargaining were hindered by asymmetric information and the Ohio
country’s status as an indivisible issue, as both issues made bargaining ineffective. Savelle sums
up the failure in bargaining excellently in his analysis, as he wrote that “Great Britain and
France were now formally at war, after a long series of more or less sincere but uniformly
ineffective attempts to avoid it by peaceful means.”100 To conclude, the combination of
asymmetric information, an indivisible issue in the Ohio country, unrealistic bargains,
inexperienced and narrow-minded diplomats, and biased government officials led to a
breakdown in bargaining between the French and the British, and the outbreak of the French and
Indian War in North America.
Brinkmanship: Offensive Actions by Britain and France
In the build-up to the French and Indian War, both Britain and France engaged in
offensive actions in an attempt to illustrate their power and resolve to the other. However, this
game of brinkmanship failed to reveal private information, and instead amplified the impact of
asymmetric information and the indivisible issue in bargaining. The brinkmanship game between
Britain and France was dominated by perceived offensive actions by both states. Essentially,
brinkmanship is when two states engage in a risk-taking competition to test the other’s resolve
and showcase their own resolve. Political scientist Robert Powell describes brinkmanship as
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essentially a game between states, as he wrote that “a brinkmanship crisis is modeled as a game
of sequential bargaining in which each state is uncertain of its adversary's resolve.”101 When both
sides have asymmetric information, which was the case in the build-up to the French and Indian
War, the dynamic of bargaining remains the same. However, issues in bargaining are amplified
by the asymmetric information, as both sides have greater incentive to showcase their resolve
and strength to the other. In support of this point, Powell writes that “two-sided incomplete
information is a more natural setting and allows for a richer bargaining dynamic.”102 Within the
game of brinkmanship, there are two main possible outcomes. First, one state could back down
after being convinced of the other side’s strength and resolve, and a peaceful bargain could be
reached. This could occur even if the state with greater resolve backs down. Second, neither state
could be convinced by the other side’s strength and resolve, and the risk-taking could continue to
escalate until war is imminent. The presence of asymmetric information does not impact either of
these two scenarios: “an increase in an adversary’s resolve may make a state more, not less,
likely to escalate. Moreover, the state with the greatest resolve may not prevail. Both findings
continue to hold with two-sided incomplete information.”103 To summarize, brinkmanship
explains one mechanism in which states attempt to deal with asymmetric information while
highlighting the double-edged sword of those efforts, as brinkmanship makes the payoff to
fighting more attractive.
Brinkmanship Prior to the French and Indian War
Prior to the outbreak of the French and Indian War, brinkmanship between the British
and the French was dominated by offensive actions from both sides. These actions were both
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intentionally offensive and perceived to be offensive. Essentially, both the French and the British
made intentional offensive actions prior to the outbreak of war. At the same time, each side
claimed that their own actions were defensive, while perceiving the other’s actions as offensive.
These perceptions created the conditions for brinkmanship to dominate the years prior to the war.
Given the historical rivalry and long-standing territorial disputes between Britain and France,
these perceptions were only amplified. This assertion is backed by political scientist Robert
Jervis, who wrote that “a state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an
adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly than a
state that see its environment as benign.”104 By itself, brinkmanship is unlikely to cause enough
issues to fully escalate a competition in risk-taking to an all-out war. Certainly, this is possible in
some cases. However, in the years prior to the outbreak of the French and Indian War, the game
of brinkmanship between the British and the French did not resolve the issues of asymmetric
information or the indivisible issue of the Ohio country. Instead, brinkmanship added more fuel
to the growing fire without resolving any of the issues of asymmetric information or the
indivisible issue of the Ohio country that was preventing a successful and peaceful bargain
between the French and the British.
The Impact of Mobilizations
Brinkmanship created the conditions for asymmetric information and an indivisible issue
to lead to conflict by making war more attractive through a series of troop mobilizations. In this
scenario, mobilizations are a clear form of brinkmanship utilized by both the British and the
French. As described by political scientist Branislav Slantchev, mobilizations increase the
incentives states have to use force: “military moves, such as arms buildups, troop mobilizations,
and deployments to the potential zone of operations, can alter incentives in a crisis by changing
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one's expected payoff from the use of force.”105 Essentially, states have a higher incentive to use
force, and a greater chance of success, when their forces are already mobilized and ready for
action. As a result, mobilizations not only increase the incentives to use force, but increase the
probability of winning: “mobilization does influence the probability of winning and, through it,
the expected utility of war.”106 Thus, the primary purpose of mobilization is not to incur costs,
but instead to increase your chances of winning the conflict. If a state is unprepared for conflict,
then that state simply has a lower chance of winning a war than if it is prepared for conflict.
Slantchev sums up this point excellently in his paper regarding mobilizations: “one can hardly
wage war without preparing for it, and the primary role of mobilization is not to incur costs but
rather to prepare for fighting by increasing the chances of victory.”107 Mobilization not only
increases your chances of winning the war, but also has an element of tying hands. In a tying
hands situation, one side is signaling to the other their resolve by signaling a commitment to a
certain action or future action. By mobilizing troops, states are essentially tying their hands by
signaling their readiness for war. Essentially, the mobilization increases the prospects of war by
increasing the chances one side wins the war, which is a hands-tying effect as described by
Slantchev: “but improving one’s prospects in fighting increases the value of war relative to peace
and can therefore have a hands-tying effect.”108 Thus, it is clear that mobilization in
brinkmanship can increase the chances of war by making conflict more attractive to the
mobilized side and through a hands-tying effect.
In the build-up to the French and Indian War, both the British and the French underwent
a mobilization sequence that increased the chances of conflict. Both sides deployed colonial
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forces, built new forts and eventually deployed troops from Europe to North America, as
described in the historical background information. Each step increased the level of conflict, as
more and better troops were moved each time. The key aspect of this brinkmanship is that both
sides were intentionally committing offensive actions while perceiving the other side’s actions as
offensive, and especially in regards to the Ohio country. Since the Ohio region was disputed
territory, every action within the territory was seen as an offensive action by both sides. Neither
side had a claim to the region originally, as the land had always been traditionally controlled by
several different Native American tribes. Because neither Britain nor France originally controlled
the territory, both sides viewed any movement by their adversary into the Ohio region as
territorial expansion and a change in the status quo. When Britain first built the trading post at
the forks of the Ohio river, the French felt that they encroached on France’s sphere of influence
and acted in an offensive manner. By the same token, when the French sent troops to remove the
British from their trading post and fort, the British viewed this as an offensive action. At the
same time, both sides knew that their own actions were offensive and intentional. It is worth
mentioning that although the building of forts is traditionally seen as a defensive action,
especially in regards to sinking costs and tying hands, in this situation the forts were a definite
offensive action. When the French and the British built forts in the Ohio region, they were
constructing forts in disputed territory that neither side had complete control over. As a result,
the building of forts expanded each side’s ability to project power into new territory. Thus, the
building of forts were clearly perceived as offensive actions by both sides. The construction of
forts was also a form of troop mobilization and deployment because they were viewed as
projections of power and literally housed the troops. Thus, any new fort increased the probability
of winning and the expected utility of war. In short, the construction of forts was seen by the
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enemy as an offensive action, despite the fact that building forts was traditionally viewed as a
defensive action by both the British and the French in the past. To conclude, the brinkmanship
game between the French and British in the years prior to the French and Indian War was filled
with intentional offensive actions that were perceived as offensive by the other side, and
eventually created the conditions for a breakdown in bargaining.
Finally, it is important to explain why brinkmanship failed to reveal private information
regarding the resolve and strength of both Britain and France. This is the original goal of
brinkmanship, as if the private information is revealed, then the chances of a peaceful settlement
in bargaining dramatically increases. However, brinkmanship did not work prior to the French
and Indian War for several reasons. First, the realities of the 18th century meant there was
relatively slow information transmission from the colonies to the decision-makers in Europe. As
a result, there were still significant sources of asymmetric information, and no one in Europe
ever fully comprehended the events occurring in North America. Second, as described earlier,
the relatively poor equality of diplomats on both sides generally ignored the signs of credibility
and resolve from both sides. Instead of working to find a peaceful solution, the diplomats
continued to repeat the same offers and refused to compromise despite the offensive actions of
the brinkmanship game occurring in North America. Finally, brinkmanship was unable to fully
deal with the indivisible issue of the Ohio country. Given the significance of the region to both
sides, it is unlikely that even successful signaling through brinkmanship would have solved this
issue. To conclude, the failure to properly signal by the British and the French through
brinkmanship helped create the conditions for conflict to begin in the French and Indian War.
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Counter-Arguments: Security Dilemma and the Spiral Theory of War
The main counter-argument to the argument presented in the current study is detailed by
Richard Smoke in his book War: Controlling Escalation. Smoke asserts that the causes of the
French and Indian War can be best explained through the spiral theory of war in the framework
of a security dilemma. Essentially, his core thesis argued that a security dilemma was present,
and that “no offensive steps by any player were made at any time.”109 The following paragraphs
will discuss his argument presented in War: Controlling Escalation, a rebuttal to his argument,
and several counterfactuals to the current study.
To begin, it is important to describe the security dilemma and spiral theory of war before
a discussion of Smoke’s argument. As described by political scientist Robert Jervis, the core of
the security dilemma is concentrated on defensive actions by both sides, with uncertainty
regarding the other side’s motives and intentions: “the means by which a state tries to increase its
security decreases the security of others” and that “one state's gain in security often inadvertently
threatens others.”110 In this scenario, when states value security about all other factors, such as
Britain and France prior to the French and Indian War, both states are more sensitive to smaller
threats while demanding a higher degree of security.111 Next, it is important to note the
importance of repeated play, especially in historical rivalries such as Britain and France. If one
state is predisposed to view the other state as an enemy, it makes their own reactions stronger
according to Jervis: “a state that is predisposed to see either a specific state other state as an
adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly than a
state that see its environment as benign.”112 As this escalation cycle develops, it translates into
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the spiral theory of war, as both sides continue to escalate until war is unavoidable due to the
pressure to match and exceed the other side’s escalation in order to protect yourself. Thus, the
security dilemma creates the conditions for the spiral theory of war.
Smoke’s central argument rests on the assertion that the security dilemma created a spiral
theory of war prior to the French and Indian War with “no offensive steps by any player” at any
point. 113
 The presence of asymmetric information, the presence of an indivisible issue, and the
brinkmanship between Britain and France are not mentioned by Smoke. Instead, the focus is
purely on the escalation sequence. Smoke wrote that “the immediate cause was the outbreak of
violence in North America and the sequence of escalations that followed.”114 As the escalation
sequence began, Smoke asserts that both sides hardened their desires to signal their resolve and
strength to the other side: “as escalatory steps were taken on each side, for several reasons
officials in London and Paris increasingly identified their major national interests with those of
their proxies, and their motivation hardened.”115 In most situations, this would lead to successful
signaling where one side would recognize the strength and resolve of their enemy and attempt to
find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. However, Smoke asserts that this simply did not
happen, as both sides did not recognize the signaling of the other and continued to escalate
instead of finding peace. To this point, Smoke wrote that “the result was that the actions each
side took to demonstrate its own resolve did not have a demonstrative effect. Instead they
progressively narrowed the other side's expectations about likely futures and transformed its
perception of a limited adversary into an implacable enemy.”116 Smoke asserts that this cycle of
escalations continued until war was unavoidable in North America, unless one side gave up their
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core objectives since “by this time the direct military consequences of each step were
outweighing the symbolic meaning and tilting the in-theater advantage so decisively that
thereafter policy-makers could not afford to hold back their responses unless they were ready to
abandon their absolute minimum objective.”117 To conclude, Smoke attributes the causes of the
French and Indian War to the security dilemma and spiral theory of war.
Rebuttal to Smoke’s Argument
The current study disagrees with Smoke’s assertions on the basis that there was no
genuine security dilemma between Great Britain and France, which eliminates the spiral theory
of war as a potential explanation for war. In “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis”,
Shiping Tang lays out the central qualifications for a situation to be labeled a security dilemma.
First, Tang asserts that a security dilemma can only exist between two defensive realist states,
with a “lack of malign intentions on both sides” as the crucial aspect, as a “security dilemma is
unintentional in origin: a genuine security dilemma can exist only between two defensive realist
states (that is, states that merely want security without intending to threaten the other).”118 As a
result, if one actor is clearly threatening the other actor in an offensive manner, there is no
security dilemma. Tang asserts this later in his paper, writing that “when one or two states are
intentionally threatening each other, there can be no real security dilemma between them.”119 As
will be shown, there are countless examples of intentional offensive actions by both Britain and
France in the build-up to the French and Indian War. Even if the situation has all other aspects of
the security dilemma, the sheer presence of malign intentions and aggressive actions prevent the
situation from being a security dilemma, which “leaves a lack of malign intentions as the most
critical ingredient for identifying whether a situation is a genuine security dilemma. When one or
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two sides in a situation is malign (that is, intentionally threatening), it is not a genuine security
dilemma even if it has all other aspects.”120 If this element is ignored, Tang asserts that any
analysis of the situation as a security dilemma is flawed and incorrect.
There are countless examples of intentional offensive actions by both the British and the
French that, according to Tang’s central assertions, nullify Smoke’s central argument that war
began because of the security dilemma and escalation sequence. The central key is not that both
sides perceived the other’s actions to be purely offensive and threatening, but that the actions
taken by both sides were actually offensive actions. As described earlier, the mobilization of
troops, the construction of forts, and the deployment of troops to disputed territories all marked
intentional offensive actions prior to the French and Indian War. Both sides launched attacks
against each other on the frontier, under the premise of removing troops from their claimed
territory. When the British planned these attacks, they were well aware of the offensive
implications of their actions. This British mentality is detailed by historian Walter Borneman,
who wrote that “there was no declaration of war, and so the British claimed, apparently with
straight faces, that these movements were simply designed to expel the French from lands that
legitimately belonged to England.”121 In addition, the French realized these plans for British
attacks and discovered the documents outlining the specific actions, meaning that the French
were well aware of the offensive nature of the British actions: “the French found not only
detailed plans for the attacks against Fort Niagara and Fort Saint Frédéric, but also extensive
plans to surprise New France and ‘invade it at a time when, on the faith of the most respectable
treaties of peace, it should be safe from any insult.’ When these documents reached Paris, they
were a diplomatic bombshell.”122 As a result, it was clear that both sides were well-aware of the
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other side's offensive actions, and still made their own intentional offensive actions. From a
larger perspective, both sides were convinced that the other had long-term offensive intentions to
take over all of North America. This perspective is illustrated through an analysis of the letters
between French diplomats by historian Walter Borneman, as he wrote that “the French were
equally convinced that it was the English who were plotting to seize the continent solely for their
own purposes.”123 Thus, it is clear that the build-up to the French and Indian War was filled with
intentional offensive actions, which nullifies the argument of a security dilemma and spiral
theory of war by Richard Smoke.
Within his own book, Smoke even acknowledges these offensive actions by both the
British and the French, as he wrote that “it was primarily because both the British and the French
both saw themselves as protecting interests that were already theirs that they could both believe
that they were acting defensively. It then followed logically that the other party must be acting
offensively” and that “each side perceived the other's moves as offensive and compellent”.124
Despite acknowledging that both sides perceived the other’s actions as offensive, Smoke still
asserts there is a security dilemma present. However, given the analysis from Shiping Tang, this
is clearly not the case. Brinkmanship better explains the situation prior to the French and Indian
War, as without a security dilemma there is no reasonable explanation for why war occurred
under the spiral theory of war. The spiral theory of war also fails to mention asymmetric
information about resolve or strength, as well as the presence of an indivisible issue in the Ohio
country. There is also no mention of the reality of 18th century diplomacy and the inexperienced
diplomats who continuously offered infeasible offers in negotiations. In support of the current
study, these diplomats also believed that the other side was the aggressor, as seen through the
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French diplomatic corp’s reaction to George Washington’s encounter with French forces in the
Ohio country. As described by historian William Nester, “Washington’s signature on a surrender
document naming him Jumonville’s murderer was a brilliant propaganda coup for the French.
The French printed and distributed the document throughout Europe. The British were clearly the
aggressors, trumpeted the French.”125 Finally, the spiral theory of war fails to acknowledge the
importance of colonial empires to the French and the British. For both sides, the colonies were
incredibly important measures of power, prestige, and economic strength, and were seen as
important enough to fight over. Historian Geoffrey Blainey echoes this perspective in his
analysis of the war, as he wrote that “for the English and French governments the colonies were
the first priority and peace was second. And if there was conflict between the two priorities, the
colonies won and peace lost.”126 Neither side simply stumbled into an escalatory sequence and
ended up fighting because of it. Both the British and the French were fully aware of the stakes of
the rising conflict. Despite this, both states escalated their actions in North America in order to
increase their chances of winning this crucial fight for the future of their colonial empires.
Additional Counter-Arguments
Two additional counter-arguments or critiques of the current argument could focus on the
indivisible issue of the Ohio region and the costs of war. Obviously, war is costly for all parties
involved. As a result, in many situations, war is simply not worth the massive costs of engaging
in a conflict with another state. However, for both the British and the French, these costs were
well worth it to protect and expand their colonial empires. As mentioned earlier, the British and
the French favored their colonies over peace, as their colonial empires were simply too crucial
for their economic power and status in Europe.127 Britain and France both realized that war
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would come with high costs but had determined that the costs were worth it to protect their
colonies. Simply put, the future profits and benefits from colonial empires were viewed as being
greater than any potential costs of war. In addition, since Britain and France were ruled by
monarchs, their government’s leaders were insulated from the costs. In France’s absolute
monarchy, this was especially the case. French diplomat Antoine Louis Rouillé illustrated this
French resolve in letters to other French diplomats, as he wrote that “his Majesty eagerly wishes
for peace…but if he is forced to make war he will fear neither the expense nor the danger.”128
Next, the counter-argument for issue indivisibility is the assertion that states can make
side-payments or divide the region to avoid the costs of war. In the right situation with the right
negotiators, this would have been certainly possible. However, given the state of British and
French diplomacy at the time, it was highly unlikely. In addition, both sides placed significant
value in controlling all of the Ohio country. The French saw the region as the crucial link
between their colonies in New France and Louisiana, while the British saw the region as the only
pathway to western expansion for their growing thirteen colonies.129 Neither side believed a
division of the region was possible, or had an interest in giving up the Ohio country for other
territory. Thus, the Ohio country clearly played a negative role in bargaining as an indivisible
issue between France and Britain.
Counterfactuals
As in any scenario, there are several counterfactuals that could have led to peace between
the British and the French prior to the French and Indian War. Either the French or the British
could have revealed their sources of asymmetric information, such as resolve and strength, to
create a peaceful settlement that would be more beneficial to both sides. However, the incentive
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to misrepresent resolve or strength in bargaining would realistically be too much for either side,
as revealing one’s weakness could lead to an unfavorable deal. If both sides were able to resolve
the indivisible issue of the Ohio country through side-payments or a division of the territory,
peace would have been much more feasible given the importance of the region in bargaining. As
discussed before, this would have been highly unlikely given Britain and France’s beliefs
regarding the importance of the region and its inability to be divided. Finally, if there was more
experienced and qualified diplomats from both countries, there certainly would have been more
realistic and feasible offers, and a peaceful settlement might have been reached if these
diplomats could recognize the signaling from the other side. However, the simple reality was that
these diplomats did not exist in either country’s diplomatic corps. At the same time, the issues of
asymmetric information and an indivisible issue in the Ohio country would have remained,
which would have made bargaining extremely difficult even for experienced diplomats.
Although there are certainly counterfactuals to the process that led to the French and Indian War,
most of them are highly unrealistic given the realities of the situation.
Conclusion
Like most wars in history, the French and Indian War can be attributed to a wide range of
different causes. However, through the lens of the bargaining theory of war, the presence of
asymmetric information and an indivisible issue directly led to the outbreak of war in North
America between the French and the British. The presence of asymmetric information with an
incentive to misrepresent, regarding matters such as strength and resolve, left French and British
diplomats clueless regarding their opponent’s motivations and objectives. Next, the indivisible
issue of the Ohio country made the possibility of a peaceful settlement unlikely, as both sides
were simply unwilling to compromise on this issue. The lack of experience and quality sources
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of information within the French and British diplomatic corps, coupled with the biases of
colonial administrators and stubbornness of royal officials, further left negotiators in an
impossible position. As a result, when combined with the brinkmanship game featuring
escalatory offensive actions from both states, war broke out between Britain and France in North
America after a series of unsuccessful negotiations between the two states. In short, in the span
of only a few years, a small conflict over a trading post at the forks of the Ohio river between
French and British colonial militia had transformed into the first major war between European
powers in North America.
There are several lessons that can be taken from the current study to better analyze other
colonial conflicts. First, the importance of geography cannot be understated. Many of the key
factors in the French and Indian War, from the development of the French and British colonies to
the status of the Ohio country as an indivisible issue, stem directly from geography. In order to
understand colonial conflicts, it is crucially important to understand the impact of geography on
both of the actors involved in the conflict. Next, the value of colonial empires to European states
during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries must be emphasized. Throughout the
build-up to the French and Indian War, both the British and the French repeatedly ignored the
warning signs that conflict was on the horizon, as both sides simply favored their colonies over
peace. From the perspective of political theory, this mentality may seem extremely irrational.
However, given the massive importance of colonies to European states, the posture of European
states such as Britain and France is actually quite logical. In order to better understand other
colonial conflicts, this mentality must always be taken into account.
Finally, the importance of indivisible issues in bargaining must be highlighted. In
political theory, indivisible issues are often dismissed as irrational and unconvincing, and there is
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much debate over whether an indivisible issue can solely prevent a peaceful settlement in
bargaining. In the current study’s opinion, indivisible issues must always be taken into account
and considered in regards to the bargaining theory of war. Throughout the build-up to the French
and Indian War, both French and British diplomats emphasized the importance of the Ohio
country and repeatedly acknowledged that the region was the major issue in negotiations. In
addition, when the indivisible issue is considered through the lens of future bargaining, it is clear
that both sides had an even greater incentive to reject any peaceful settlement. When analyzing
other colonial conflicts, scholars must consider the impact of indivisible issues, which clearly
play a major role in preventing a peaceful settlement between two states.
The current study also believes there are two important lessons that can be taken from the
historical analysis of the causes of the French and Indian War, and applied to the present-day and
future. First, the importance of clear and concise communication within one’s own government
and bureaucracy, and with any potential adversary, is a crucial aspect needed for any opportunity
of a peaceful settlement. Throughout the build-up to the French and Indian War, communication
repeatedly failed within the French and British regimes, and between French and British
diplomats in bargaining. Both sides were never on the same page, and both home countries had
little idea of what was truly going on in their colonies. In order to increase the chances of a
peaceful settlement, countries must emphasize clear and concise communication within their
own ranks, and with their adversaries.
Second, all countries should strive to develop and maintain an elite diplomatic corps that
has the authority and ability to negotiate with other countries. In the bargaining prior to conflict,
Britain and France’s diplomatic corps were staffed with inexperienced and under trained
diplomats. Because of this, the chances of a peaceful settlement were drastically lowered, and
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that is before the issues of asymmetric information, an indivisible issue, and brinkmanship were
considered. If a country has an inexperienced, underfunded, and weak diplomatic corps, then
their chances of averting conflict with other countries is drastically lowered. In short, one of the
central keys to achieving peace throughout the globe in the present-day and in the future is the
development and maintenance of properly funded and trained diplomatic corps who have the
authority and ability to find peaceful settlements in bargaining, even if there is asymmetric
information and an indivisible issue present. Although the French and Indian War occurred over
two hundred and fifty years ago, the current study firmly believes that both of these lessons can
be applied for the greater good today, and for the maintenance of world peace in the future.
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